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ToRTs-UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEASORS ACT-GENERAL 
RELEASE OF ONE ToRTFEASOR RELEASES ALL-Plaintiff, riding as a passenger 
with X, was injured in an accident involving the automobile driven by X 
and a truck owned by defendan~. Several months later X paid plaintiff 
$1,518.87 and received a release.1 Plaintiff then brought an action in 
trespass against the defendant, charging negligence in causing the accident 
and claiming $10,000 damages. The defendant joined X as an additional 
defendant and X pleaded the release. Defendant's amended answer claimed 
l The release provided that plaintiff did "' •.• release and forever discharge [X] and 
any and all other persons, associations and corporations, whether herein named or 
referred to or not, of and from any and every claim, demand, right, or cause of 
action .•• .'" Principal case at 550, 172 A.2d at 764. This release was a printed form of 
the type commonly used in settling claims. 
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that the broad language of the release, "any and all other persons,"2 within 
the meaning of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,3 
provided a release for the defendant also. The lower court entered 
judgment on the pleadings against plaintiff, and in favor of both X and 
the defendant. On appeal, held, affirmed, two justices dissenting. The intent 
of plaintiff to release all of the tortfeasors was clearly evidenced, as required 
by statute,4 by the language of the release. Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 
549, 172 A.2d 764 (1961). 
At common law a release given to one of a number of joint wrongdoers 
was said to extinguish the cause of action, thus releasing all.5 Recognizing 
the harshness of such a rule when applied to cases where the consideration 
received for the release was not intended to be a full satisfaction of the 
injured party's claim, many jurisdictions have adopted modifications. 
One succesful device is the covenant not to sue.6 Other courts have held 
that an express reservation of a right to pursue other wrongdoers will 
preserve the cause of action.7 Prior to adoption of the Uniform Contribution 
Among Tortfeasors Act, however, Pennsylvania had rejected any modifi-
cations to the old common-law rule,8 and was one of a very small number of 
jurisdictions in which a release of a single joint tortfeasor was impossible.9 
Section 4 of the Uniform Act was intended to change the common-law rule 
concerning releases10 and the Pennsylvania courts have recognized that the 
legislature adopted it for that purpose.11 However, an examination of the 
decision in the principal case indicates that the court is not yet willing to 
embrace whole-heartedly the policy considerations underlying the statute. 
The common-law rule that a release of one tortfeasor released all was 
grounded on the basic judicial policy of allowing an injured party but 
2 See note l supra. 
3 The UNIFORM CoN11UllUTION AMONG ToRTFEASORS Acr was adopted by Pennsylvania 
in 1951. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-2089 (1951). The relevant provision is § 2085 
(§ 4 of the Uniform Act) which reads as follows: "A release by the injured person of 
one joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other 
tortfeasors unless the release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other tort• 
feasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release or in any amount or 
proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced if greater 
than the consideration paid." (Emphasis added.) 
<t Ibid. 
5 Cocke v. Jenner, Hob. 66, 80 Eng. Rep. 214 (K.B. 1614). Virtually all American 
courts have followed the English rule. See, e.g., Bee v. Cooper, 217 Cal. 96, 17 P.2d 740 
(1932) • See generally Annot., 148 A.L.R. 1270 (1944) • 
6 See, e.g., Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P .2d 783 (1945) • 
1 See, e.g., Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954). 
8 Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 Atl. 107 (1937) (rejected reservation of right) ; 
Smith v. Roydhouse, Arey 8e Co., 244 Pa. 474, 90 Atl. 919 (1914) (rejected covenant not 
to sue). 
g P1tossER, TORTS § 46, at 244 8e n.24 (2d ed. 1955) . 
10 See Commissioner's Note, 9 UNIFORM L. ANN. 242 (1957) • 
11 Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 275, 149 A.2d 648, 651 (1959). 
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one satisfaction of his claim.12 One purpose of the Uniform Act is to 
preserve this principle and yet to alleviate the harshness of the common-law 
rule. The Uniform Act states that a release given to one wrongdoer will 
not be construed to discharge the remaining tortfeasors unless the instru-
ment "so provides." This provision was obviously designed to give effect 
to the intent of the parties to a release. It is plain that an attempt to honor 
the intent of the releasing party is not inconsistent with the policy of 
prohibiting double recovery, for the question of intent is directed specifi-
cally to whether the claimant intended the release to represent satisfaction 
in full for his injury.13 Furthermore, any possibility of a double recovery is 
precluded by the provision of section 4 of the Uniform Act which stipulates 
that the claim against other tortfeasors shall be reduced by the amount of 
the consideration paid for the release.14 Any fears which a court might 
entertain with respect to a possible injustice resulting from giving full effect 
to the releasing party's intent would appear to be unwarranted. Yet, the 
holding of the court in the principal case is based on an exceptionally 
narrow finding,15 that the intent of the parties should be determined solely 
by reference to the very general language of the release. It has been 
suggested, indeed in this very jurisdiction, that a mere resort by the courts 
to the language of an instrument, in ascertaining the intent of the parties, 
is insufficient and improper.16 Frequently the framework of the release 
instrument is a printed form, as was the case here. Often, too, the parties 
to a release will not contemplate its effect upon any persons but themselves. 
Thus, a complete disregard of the facts and circumstances existing at the 
time of the execution of the release may well result in a binding contract 
which the parties never actually intended. Such a result would be in total 
discord with the policy underlying the Uniform Act, as well as the 
announced policy of the Pennsylvania courts.17 
12 Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 Atl. 107 (1937) . 
13 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 
119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954). See I HARPER 8: JAMES, TORTS § IO.I, at 713 (1956); PROSSER, 
TORTS § 46, at 245 (2d ed. 1955). Cf. Raughley v. Delaware Coach Co., 47 Del. 343, 91 A.2d 
245 (1952) (Uniform Act) • 
14 See note 3 supra. 
15 "The intent of the parties must be gleaned from the language of the release; such 
language clearly and unequivocally shows the intent of the parties that [plaintiff] was 
releasing his claims not only against [X] but against 'any and all' persons, including the 
[defendant] .••• " Principal case at 552, 172 A.2d at 765. 
16 Hegmann v. Mitchell, 179 Pa. Super. 123, 128, 116 A.2d 320, 322 (1955). See 
Mayle v. Criss, 169 F. Supp. 58, 60 (W.D. Pa. 1958) (West Virginia statute): Comment, 
107 U. PA. L. REV. 1213 (1959). 
17 Brill's Estate, 337 Pa. 525, 12 A.2d 50, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 713 (1940) (words of 
release should not be construed to make a contract which the parties never intended) : 
Cockcroft v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 125 Pa. Super 293, 189 Atl. 687 (1937) (general 
release does not bar a claim, the existence of which was not known to the party giving 
the release); Pierce v. Sweet, 33 Pa. 151 (1859) (release not excepted from the rule that a 
written instrument is construed according to the intention of the parties) . 
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The harsh holding in the principal case is objectionable on several 
grounds. Such a judicial attitude will tend to discourage settlements, since 
it confuses this area of the law by a strict interpretation of the Uniform 
Act in the light of the policy underlying the common-law rule, rather than 
by giving effect to the intent of the parties in accordance with the purpose 
of the statute. A more important objection, all too clearly illustrated by 
the principal decision, is that an unwary claimant may fail to realize full 
compensation. A third ground is that arguably the non-settling tortfeasor 
should not be allowed to reap the benefits of a contract to which he was not 
a party and for which he gave no consideration. This last objection was 
the primary basis for the vigorous dissent in the principal case. But it 
would seem that the real question raised is not who was intended to benefit 
from the release but, rather, whether the release was intended to serve as a 
full satisfaction of the injured party's claim. And only by reference to the 
circumstances and the actions of the parties can the true intent be known. 
This question properly should be presented for determination by the trier 
of fact.18 Introduction of such evidence generally would not violate the 
parol evidence rule if the question of intent is directed to satisfaction of the 
claim rather than to identification of the parties released.19 In the 
principal case, extrinsic evidence directed toward a showing of intended 
satisfaction, or lack of it, would not have tended to vary the terms of the 
written agreement. A holding as a matter of law that the parties intended 
the release to represent satisfaction of all claims is not justified where the 
language of the release is so general as to fail to indicate any actually 
formulated intent on this precise question.20 
Robert L. Harmon 
18 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 664- (D.C. Cir. 1943). 
19 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 217 (1954). Some courts have held that one not a party 
to a release should not be allowed to raise an objection to parol evidence. E.g., Reams v. 
Janoski, 268 Ill. App. 8 (1932) ; Fitzgerald v. Union Stock Yards Co., 89 Neb. 393, 131 
N.W. 612 (19II). 
20 Indeed, the Pennsylvania court in an earlier case stated: "Hence we believe that in 
§ 4 the legislature quite reasonably enacted that such a release is not a discharge of other 
tortfeasors unless it specifically so states." (Emphasis added.) Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 
270, 275, 149 A.2d 648, 651 (1959) . 
